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Abstract This article presents the Mafia Index (MI), an index measuring the 
presence of mafias at the provincial level.  
In the abundant literature on Italian mafias, relatively few studies have 
attempted to measure the presence of mafias across the country. A review of 
previous attempts points out the limitations and methodological shortcomings 
of existing measurements.  
The study provides an operational definition of ‘mafia’ and selects the most 
appropriate indicators and variables according to multiple criteria. The MI 
combines data on mafia-type associations, mafia murders, city councils 
dissolved for infiltration by organised crime, and assets confiscated from 
organised crime and covers the period between 1983 and 2009. The MI 
highlights the strong concentration of the mafias in their original territories, but 
also their significant presence in central and northern provinces. This confirms 
that mafias should not be regarded as typically southern Italian phenomena, but 
rather as a national problem. 
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Introduction 
Among the Italian words best-known in the world, mafia is surely the most infamous. 
Among Italy’s many achievements, being the country of origin of the mafias is 
 2 
certainly the most inglorious.
1
 Italy also has  primacy in literary and scientific 
production on mafias. The Italian literature on the mafia is so abundant that it  could 
fill an entire library.
2
 Surprisingly, however, a relatively small number of studies and 
publications have attempted to measure the presence of mafias on the Italian territory. 
This may appear remarkable, for the analysis of a problem is a key step towards 
solving it. An appropriate analysis requires reliable data and information. But the 
unavailability of direct and easily accessible data should not preclude attempts to 
estimate problems, with a view to improving knowledge about them and consequently 
to devising solutions. Probably, better data and information sharing, and therefore 
better measurements, could contribute to Italy’s efforts to prevent mafias or to enforce 
the law against them. 
                                                 
 
1
 For the purpose of this study, ‘mafias’ refers not only to the Sicilian Mafia but also to other 
criminal groups which share some significant features with the latter (although they are not 
the same phenomenon). Traditionally there are four main mafias in Italy: besides the Sicilian 
Mafia, there are the Camorra, the ‘Nrangheta and the Sacra Corona Unita. Some authors talk 
of a “fifth” mafia, referring to criminal phenomena exhibiting some of the significant features 
of the four main groups. This denomination has been applied to criminal groups in Sicily, 
Sardinia, Basilicata and Veneto (see for example, Bascietto, Stidda. La quinta mafia, i boss, 
gli affari, i rapporti con la politica; Sergi, Gli anni dei basilischi.In general, the category 
‘mafias’ is widely accepted in the Italian literature (where mafie is the plural form of the 
word. See Santino, Dalla Mafia Alle Mafie; Fiandaca and Costantino, La Mafia, Le Mafie; 
Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove; Pezzino, Le mafie.) and at the international level 
(usually including other phenomena such as the Yakuza, the Triads and the so-called Russian 
Mafia. See, for example, Varese, “How Mafias Migrate”; Naylor, “Mafias, Myths, and 
Markets: On the Theory and Practice of Enterprise Crime.”). Moreover, it is customary to 
apply the term ‘mafia’ (in the singular) to criminal organizations other than the Sicilian 
Mafia.  
In Italy, the allocation of other similar criminal groups to the category ‘mafia’ also occurs in 
criminal law. The last paragraph of Article 416-bis of the Italian Criminal Code (mafia-type 
association) explicitly states: “the provisions above apply also to the camorra, the ‘ndrangheta 
and other associations, however known or called, even foreign, which use the intimidatory 
power of the group to achieve the goals typical of a mafia-type association”. 
2
 Several publications have exclusively focused on compiling bibliographies on the mafia. See 
Chindemi and Corso, Bibliografia Sulla Mafia; Dioguardi, Bibliografia Sulla Mafia, 1987-
2000; Lanfranchini and Marin, Per Conoscere La Mafia; Mercadante, Mafia: Bibliografia 
ragionata; Bedotto, Mafie: Panorama bibliografico (1945-1993). As far as possible, this 
article will cite and refer to English publications (either original works or translations from 
Italian). However, most references will inevitably be to Italian works.  
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The aim of this article is to contribute to the existing measurements of the 
presence of mafias across the Italian territory. It presents and discusses the Mafia 
Index (MI hereinafter), which is a composite index measuring the presence of mafias 
at the provincial level in Italy.  
The following section (Section 1) discusses the shortcomings of the existing 
measurements of mafias in Italy, reviewing the most recent attempts to create indexes 
of the presence of mafias and/or organised crime. The article then presents the 
methodology used to create the Mafia Index (Section 2). The MI is analysed and 
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
1. Analysis of existing attempts to measure the presence of mafias and 
organised crime in Italy 
This section briefly reviews reports and scientific studies seeking to measure mafias 
and/or organised crime in Italy (1.1). It highlights that most of the existing 
measurements have significant shortcomings and that there is a need for a new and 
better index (1.2.).  
1.1. The most recent measurements of mafia and organised crime in Italy 
A review of the current state of the art in measurement of the presence of the mafias 
and/or organised crime in Italy points up problems and difficulties with the existing 
measurement exercises.
3
 This review focuses on the overall aim of the studies and on 
the measurement methodology adopted.  
                                                 
 
3
 For the sake of brevity this article focuses only on contributions published in the past five 
years.  
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The Organised crime index by ISTAT 
The Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) has created an organised crime 
index (OCI)
4
  whose purpose is to support the evaluation of public policies to reduce 
socio-economic disparities in Southern Italy. The ISTAT index includes data on a 
wide variety of crimes at regional
5
 level from 1995 to 2006 (although data for 2004 
and 2005 are missing).
6
 ISTAT calculates the OCI by summing the absolute values 
for each crime weighted for the average statutory penalty. The OCI is parameterised 
to 1995 (1995=100). Table 1 reports the OCI for all Italian regions.  
                                                 
 
4
 ISTAT, “B. Indicatori di contesto chiave e variabili di rottura.” 
5
 In Italy, regions are the highest level of local administration. As a consequence of 
progressive legislative reforms, regions have acquired significant powers and autonomy, 
including legislative competence on a wide variety of matters. There are twenty Italian 
regions, and their number did not change during the time period covered by this study.  
6
 ISTAT has adopted the operational definition of organised crime used by the Italian 
Ministry of the Interior. The definition comprises mafia murders, bomb or fire attacks, arsons, 
serious robberies (e.g. bank or post offices). The source of the data is the operational database 
of the Italian law enforcement agencies. Until 2003 this database was known as “modello 
165”, while since 2004 a new system (“SDI”, acronym for Sistema di Indagine) has replaced 
the previous one. 
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Table 1. The ISTAT Organised Crime Index 
Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Piedmont 100.0 112.1 120.4 146.0 163.7 156.4 146.9 148.5 148.1 N/a N/a 160.0 
Aosta Valley 100.0 79.4 59.9 166.2 81.0 40.1 149.0 101.6 142.4 N/a N/a 69.6 
Lombardy 100.0 95.8 103.1 113.7 99.2 99.6 100.6 108.3 107.2 N/a N/a 141.9 
Trentino-Alto Adige 100.0 124.1 98.3 93.0 84.4 82.2 46.0 83.8 95.5 N/a N/a 68.1 
Veneto 100.0 112.7 118.3 139.8 174.6 153.8 118.6 128.2 140.6 N/a N/a 124.1 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 100.0 128.0 131.3 130.6 147.4 135.5 94.7 101.4 95.4 N/a N/a 77.6 
Liguria 100.0 102.4 108.2 126.2 145.4 114.8 116.2 96.2 133.8 N/a N/a 231.4 
Emilia-Romagna 100.0 102.3 114.6 128.3 120.8 146.5 136.3 127.5 122.0 N/a N/a 140.6 
Tuscany 100.0 95.5 104.0 123.4 122.8 105.8 111.1 116.8 115.0 N/a N/a 126.1 
Umbria 100.0 156.5 126.4 164.1 166.0 259.3 264.7 162.4 223.4 N/a N/a 304.3 
Marche 100.0 152.5 121.5 220.0 193.2 217.3 191.6 161.1 184.8 N/a N/a 233.2 
Lazio 100.0 91.0 89.6 120.0 97.0 145.5 124.9 119.8 112.4 N/a N/a 153.3 
Abruzzo 100.0 119.6 114.2 148.0 156.0 171.7 127.5 123.4 170.1 N/a N/a 193.6 
Molise 100.0 68.7 106.4 157.0 56.8 110.7 118.8 73.3 108.7 N/a N/a 250.8 
Campania 100.0 95.5 97.9 106.8 80.9 94.9 98.9 96.0 105.0 N/a N/a 132.3 
Apulia 100.0 98.6 106.3 111.4 121.7 132.1 129.1 104.8 117.3 N/a N/a 119.3 
Basilicata 100.0 90.6 102.7 57.4 84.4 170.2 138.4 88.4 74.5 N/a N/a 99.8 
Calabria 100.0 91.5 91.3 82.8 88.0 74.4 90.5 84.4 98.2 N/a N/a 111.2 
Sicily 100.0 97.7 89.6 91.1 87.4 74.2 88.0 78.4 96.8 N/a N/a 48.3 
Sardinia 100.0 83.4 105.0 146.3 136.5 109.7 99.5 97.5 112.7 N/a N/a 42.2 
Italy 100.0 98.5 100.7 111.9 108.5 108.0 107.4 101.7 111.4 N/a N/a 111.7 
Source: ISTAT 2010 
The Eurispes Mafia Penetration Index 
The Institute of Political, Economic and Social Studies (Eurispes) created the Indice 
di penetrazione mafiosa
7
 (IPM) in 2004.
8
 The aim of the IPM is to measure the level 
of permeability of a given territory to organised crime.
9
 
The 2004 and 2005 editions of the IPM focused only on the provinces of 
Calabria.
10
 The IPM includes several socio-economic variables.
11
 For each indicator, 
                                                 
 
7
 Mafia penetration index. 
8 Eurispes, 16° Rapporto Italia 2004. 
9
 Ibid., 425. 
10
 In Italy, provinces are mid-level administrative units. They have particular importance from 
a criminological point of view because law enforcement agencies are frequently organised on 
a provincial basis. Until 1992 there were 95 provinces. In 1992, 7 provinces were created 
(Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Biella, Lecco, Lodi, Rimini, Prato, Crotone, Vibo Valentia), bringing 
the total to 103 provinces. In 2001, 4 new provinces were created in Sardinia (Olbia-Tempio, 
Ogliastra, Medio Campidano and Carbonia-Iglesias) and implemented in 2004. In 2004, 3 
new provinces were created (Monza e della Brianza, Fermo and Barletta-Andria-Trani) and 
were implemented in 2009. This study is based on crime statistics. These refer, for the 1983-
1995 period, to the pre-1992 set of 95 provinces for which data are available since 1996 (due 
to a lag in adaptation of the data collection procedures) For the 1996-onward period, the study 
refers to the set of 103 provinces, once again owing to lags in adaptation of the data collection 
procedures.  
 6 
the province with the highest value (i.e. the worst situation) receives a score of 10. 
The other provinces receive decreasing scores according to their rank among all the 
provinces analysed. The sum of the scores provides the value of the IPM. Eurispes did 
not calculate the IPM in 2006. 
In 2007 and 2008 Eurispes extended the measurement of the IPM to the four 
Italian regions with a traditional presence of mafia-type groups (Apulia, Calabria, 
Campania and Sicily, see footnote 1) and modified the indicators.
12
 In 2009 Eurispes 
did not calculate the IPM.  
The IPM changed once again in 2010. It now includes only the rates for a 
number of offences attributable to mafia-type associations.
13
 The IPM covers the 24 
provinces of the regions with a traditional presence of mafias, and the year 2008. For 
each offence, the province with the highest rate receives a score of 7.7. The other 
provinces receive a score proportional to their rate. The sum of the scores on each 
offence yields the IPM. Table 2 reports the IPM for 2010.  
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 Unemployment rate, trust in the institutions, crime rates for offences committed by mafia-
type associations (extortion, smuggling, drug production, drug possession and drug dealing, 
criminal association, mafia-type association, exploitation of prostitution, handling stolen 
goods), city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration, intimidatory acts against local 
administrators and, only for IPM 2005, mafia murders.  
12
 Unemployment rate, crimes attributable to mafia associations per 10,000 inhabitants (sum 
of extortion, drug production, possession and dealing, mafia-type association, exploitation 
and facilitation of prostitution, handling stolen goods, bomb and fire attacks), mafia murders 
per 10,000 inhabitants, city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration (absolute values), number 
of episodes of terrorism or political violence (absolute values) and number of phone 
interceptions in the provinces (absolute values). Eurispes, 20° Rapporto Italia 2008, 470. 
13 
Bomb or fire attacks, mass murders, handling stolen goods, robberies, extortions, usury, 
kidnap for ransom, mafia-type association, money-laundering, smuggling, drug production 
and trafficking, exploitation and facilitation of prostitution, mafia murders. Eurispes, 22° 
Rapporto Italia 2010, 597.  
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Table 2. The Eurispes IPM for 2010  
Province IPM 2010 Province IPM 2010 
Napoli 65.4 Salerno 32.7 
Catania 52.4 Messina 31.9 
Caserta 51.0 Trapani 29.4 
Brindisi 51.0 Avellino 29.3 
Reggio Calabria 50.5 Enna 29.2 
Foggia 47.3 Agrigento 28.9 
Catanzaro  41.2 Benevento 28.9 
Bari 41.0 Crotone 28.6 
Siracusa 38.6 Ragusa 28.4 
Vibo Valentia 37.5 Cosenza  27.1 
Palermo 35.5 Taranto 24.8 
Caltanissetta 33.1 Lecce 18.3 
Source: Eurispes 2010 
The analyses by Censis 
The Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (Censis) has performed two analyses to 
measure the presence of organised crime in a territory.
14
  
The first analysis (see Table 3) measured the presence of mafia-type 
organizations using three proxy indicators,
15
 and it covered the four Italian regions 
with a traditional presence of mafia-type groups and a time period of three years, 
probably from 2004 to 2006.
16
 It calculated the number of municipalities exhibiting at 
least one of the above-mentioned ‘contiguity signs’ per province, as well as their 
percentage on the total number of municipalities, their population on the total 
provincial population, and their land area on the total provincial area.
17
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 Censis, Il condizionamento delle mafie sull’economia, sulla società e sulle istituzioni del 
Mezzogiorno. 
15
 Mafia “clans” identified in reports by the Ministry of Interior and by the Anti-camorra 
Observatory of the Campania region, the number of city councils dissolved for mafia 
infiltration and the number of assets confiscated from organised crime. 
16
 The study does not clearly state the time span of the data. 
17
 Censis, Il condizionamento delle mafie sull’economia, sulla società e sulle istituzioni del 
Mezzogiorno, 10. 
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Table 3. Censis measurements of mafias’ presence 
Province and region 
Affected municipalities Population in affected 
municipalities (% of 
the total) 
Surface area of the 
affected 
municipalities (% of 
the total) 
Absolute values % 
Avellino 19 16 38.2 13.4 
Benevento 28 35.9 56.2 31.1 
Caserta 49 47.1 77.9 50.2 
Napoli 73 79.3 95 86.4 
Salerno 34 21.5 69.5 24.9 
Totale Campania 203 36.8 81.3 33.7 
Bari 27 56.3 79.8 66.9 
Brindisi 12 60 80.2 79.9 
Foggia 15 23.4 70 50.9 
Lecce 26 26.8 52.2 46.6 
Taranto 17 58.6 78.5 71.5 
Total Apulia 97 37.6 72.5 59.9 
Catanzaro 20 25 65.3 32.2 
Cosenza 18 11.6 41.7 16.2 
Crotone 11 40.7 72.6 55.8 
Reggio Calabria 51 52.6 85.3 58.7 
Vibo Valentia 15 30 59.7 32.3 
Total Calabria 115 28.1 62.5 33.4 
Agrigento 37 86 95.9 93.8 
Caltanissetta 17 77.3 95.2 91.4 
Catania 32 55.2 79.7 56.7 
Enna 12 60 73.8 59.4 
Messina 16 14.8 57.1 21.8 
Palermo 46 56.1 90.9 55.9 
Ragusa 6 50 57.5 47.5 
Siracusa 13 61.9 88.7 77.1 
Trapani 16 66..7 91 81..8 
Total Sicily 195 50 82 63..2 
Totale 4 regioni 610 37.9 77.2 50.8 
Source: Censis 2009 
The second analysis (see Table 4) by Censis measured the presence of 
offences ‘directly attributable to organised crime’18 in the Italian regions and in the 
provinces of the four Italian regions with a traditional presence of mafia-type 
groups.
19
 The analysis covered the time period 2004-2007 and calculated the sum of 
the offences and the rates per 100,000 inhabitants. Moreover, for each offence, the 
analysis calculated the provincial rates per 100,000 inhabitants, comparing the 2007 
data with the 2004 or 1998 data.
20
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-type associations, money-
laundering, arson, smuggling, association for drug production and trafficking, association for 
drug dealing.  
19
 Censis, Il condizionamento delle mafie sull’economia, sulla società e sulle istituzioni del 
Mezzogiorno, 13. 
20 
The study does not explain the reasons for the difference in the comparison years.  
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Table 4. Organised crime offences by Censis 
Regions 
Absolute values 
2007 
Rates per 100.000 
inhab. 
Trend 2004-2007 
% 
variation of the 
rates 
Campania 4.663 80.2 61.5 30.4 
Apulia 2.848 69.9 26.5 14.5 
Calabria 3.228 160.8 26.3 33.6 
Sicily 2.411 47.9 14.4 5.9 
Total 4 regions with traditional presence of 
mafias 
13.150 77.7 34.2 19.6 
Piedmont 1.384 31.4 11 2.6 
Aosta Valley 20 15.9 -20 -4.5 
Lombardy 2.796 29 20.2 4.2 
Trentino-Alto Adige 185 18.4 -8.9 -2.5 
Veneto 919 19 11.5 1.5 
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 253 20.7 24 3.8 
Liguria 953 59.2 25.4 11.5 
Emilia-Romagna 1.157 27.1 19.9 3.8 
Tuscany 1.202 32.7 10.3 2.4 
Umbria 361 40.8 47.3 12.3 
Marche 489 31.5 33.2 7.3 
Lazio 2.535 45.6 61.5 15.8 
Abruzzo 615 46.5 48.6 14.6 
Molise 325 101.3 82.6 46 
Basilicata 171 28.9 0 0.3 
Sardinia 451 27.1 -12.3 -4.1 
South 14.712 70.6 32.8 17.2 
Centre-North 12.254 31.6 24.7 5.5 
Italy 26.969 45.2 29 9.5 
Source: Censis 2009 
 
Other contributions in the literature 
Some contributions in the literature have sought to measure the presence of mafias in 
Italy. There follows a rapid review of the most recent studies, focusing exclusively on 
their attempts to create indexes measuring the presence of mafias and/or organised 
crime.  
Daniele and Marani analysed the relation between organised crime and foreign 
direct investments (FDI).
21
 Used as indicators by the study were criminal associations 
and mafia-type associations, fire or bomb attacks, arsons and extortions at the 
provincial and regional level for the period 2002-2005.
22
 However the bulk of the 
analysis of the relation between FDI and organised crime used 2002-2004 data for all 
four crimes (see Table 5) and created an organised crime index representing the ‘the 
                                                 
 
21
 Daniele and Marani, “Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy.” 
22
 Ibid., 19. 
 10 
sum of extortion and mafia-type association crimes per 10,000 inhabitants’ (see Table 
5. Extortion, criminal association, attacks and fires. Rates per 10,000 inhab., 
2002-05 (Italy=100) 
Region Extortion Criminal association Attacks Arson 
Abruzzo 108 119 47 67 
Basilicata 87 222 29 94 
Calabria 185 196 717 346 
Campania 162 155 99 107 
Emilia-Romagna 77 56 24 66 
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 64 96 29 52 
Lazio 86 109 35 78 
Liguria 70 83 39 121 
Lombardy 70 71 35 65 
Marche 77 68 26 53 
Molise 124 104 34 110 
Piedmont 102 51 58 83 
Apulia 150 119 200 146 
Sardinia 74 36 429 149 
Sicily 143 177 186 166 
Tuscany 88 81 41 92 
Trentino-Alto Adige 49 90 28 59 
Umbria 75 89 35 66 
Aosta Valley 44 86 26 38 
Veneto 52 62 18 50 
Centre-North 76 74 34 71 
South 144 147 220 153 
Source: Daniele and Marani 2008 
).
23
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 Ibid., 16. 
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Table 5. Extortion, criminal association, attacks and fires. Rates per 10,000 
inhab., 2002-05 (Italy=100) 
Region Extortion Criminal association Attacks Arson 
Abruzzo 108 119 47 67 
Basilicata 87 222 29 94 
Calabria 185 196 717 346 
Campania 162 155 99 107 
Emilia-Romagna 77 56 24 66 
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 64 96 29 52 
Lazio 86 109 35 78 
Liguria 70 83 39 121 
Lombardy 70 71 35 65 
Marche 77 68 26 53 
Molise 124 104 34 110 
Piedmont 102 51 58 83 
Apulia 150 119 200 146 
Sardinia 74 36 429 149 
Sicily 143 177 186 166 
Tuscany 88 81 41 92 
Trentino-Alto Adige 49 90 28 59 
Umbria 75 89 35 66 
Aosta Valley 44 86 26 38 
Veneto 52 62 18 50 
Centre-North 76 74 34 71 
South 144 147 220 153 
Source: Daniele and Marani 2008 
Map 1. Extortion and criminal associations in the Italian regions, 2002-05* 
 
* Index calculated as the sum of crimes for the period 2002-2005 per 10,000 inhabitants. 
Source: Daniele and Marani 2008 
Mennella analysed the impact of organised crime on the labour market
24
 by 
creating an organised crime index including 2004 data for a number of offences.
25
 The 
                                                 
 
24
 Mennella, “Reti sociali, criminalità organizzata e mercati locali del lavoro.” 
25 
Criminal association, mafia-type association, slaughter, bomb and fire attacks, mafia 
murders, extortions, arsons, handling stolen goods, usury, drug crimes, exploitation and 
facilitation of prostitution.  
 12 
index summed the crimes and then calculated the provincial rates per 1,000 
inhabitants. 
Lavezzi analysed the structure of the Sicilian economy compared to those of 
other Italian regions in order to highlight the importance of factors favourable to 
organised crime (large size of the construction sector, large number of small firms, 
low level of technology, and a large public sector).
26
 Lavezzi acknowledged the limits 
of his study in estimating the presence of the mafia, which was measured with a 
dummy for Sicily.
27
 
Caruso focused on the relation between organised crime and economic life in 
Italian regions.
28
 His study adopted the OCI compiled by ISTAT.  
Centorrino and Ofria analysed the relation between organised crime and 
labour productivity in Italian regions.
29
 For each region, the proxy measure for 
organised crime was mafia murders from 1983 to 2005 on the total population.  
Calderoni and Caneppele sought to measure the extent of infiltration by mafia 
in public procurement in the provinces of Southern Italy.
30
 The study created a 
criminal context index (indice di contesto criminale or ICC) consisting of five 
indicators intended to yield multiple information on mafia infiltration of public 
                                                 
 
26
 Lavezzi, “Economic structure and vulnerability to organised crime.” 
27 
The dummy should help explain the greater relevance of specific economic sectors in areas 
with a presence of organised crime. 
28
 Caruso, Spesa pubblica e criminalità organizzata in Italia: evidenza empirica su dati panel 
nel periodo 1997-2003. 
29
 Centorrino and Ofria, “Criminalità organizzata e produttività del lavoro nel Mezzogiorno.” 
30
 Calderoni and Caneppele, La geografia criminale degli appalti. 
 13 
procurement.
31
 For each indicator, the province with the highest rate received a score 
of 100. The other provinces were scored proportionally.
32
 The ICC was the mean of 
the scores of the five indicators (Table 6). 
Table 6. Calderoni and Caneppele’s ICC 
Provinces 
Mafia 
murders 
Mafia-type 
association 
Dissolution of 
city councils 
Confiscated 
assets 
Offences 
relating to public 
procurement 
ICC Rank 
Reggio Calabria 74.3 100.0 49.6 67.1 100.0 78.2 1.0 
Crotone 100.0 42.2 23.2 25.5 99.5 58.1 2.0 
Napoli 70.8 25.0 100.0 9.9 38.0 48.7 3.0 
Palermo 10.0 33.5 58.6 100.0 27.6 45.9 4.0 
Caltanissetta 14.9 82.2 47.5 21.8 54.7 44.2 5.0 
Catanzaro 50.2 55.5 18.3 9.4 57.3 38.2 6.0 
Catania 35.3 53.5 32.4 29.2 18.2 33.7 7.0 
Caserta 50.0 25.7 44.2 22.4 22.9 33.0 8.0 
Trapani 2.2 27.3 43.6 44.2 40.5 31.6 9.0 
Vibo Valentia 12.9 27.9 20.9 21.9 72.1 31.1 10.0 
Enna 21.3 61.7 0.0 8.2 60.8 30.4 11.0 
Ragusa 11.7 65.1 17.4 13.2 20.6 25.6 12.0 
Agrigento 13.2 18.6 19.5 24.1 40.9 23.2 13.0 
Messina 11.1 28.5 3.9 10.8 51.4 21.1 14.0 
Cosenza 13.3 17.7 0.0 3.0 70.0 20.8 15.0 
Benevento 2.2 10.8 2.7 0.0 80.9 19.3 16.0 
Brindisi 7.8 23.1 0.0 20.1 35.2 17.3 17.0 
Bari 17.6 10.4 21.8 16.2 17.7 16.7 18.0 
Siracusa 11.1 34.2 0.0 6.9 30.6 16.6 19.0 
Salerno 5.6 13.5 6.6 5.8 36.4 13.6 20.0 
Lecce 10.7 15.3 4.3 6.8 24.5 12.3 21.0 
Potenza 3.2 4.3 0.0 0.0 49.0 11.3 22.0 
Matera 0.0 23.5 0.0 5.6 26.7 11.2 23.0 
Avellino 6.6 13.8 5.3 1.2 28.4 11.0 24.0 
Taranto 0.5 18.5 0.0 13.3 22.0 10.9 25.0 
Cagliari 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.6 50.8 10.8 26.0 
Oristano 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.2 43.9 9.5 27.0 
Foggia 14.2 11.9 0.0 3.8 14.0 8.8 28.0 
Sassari 0.7 0.0 0.0 5.1 27.6 6.7 29.0 
Nuoro 1.2 3.2 0.0 0.8 15.1 4.1 30.0 
Source: Calderoni and Caneppele 2009 
1.2. Analysis of existing attempts to measure the mafia in Italy 
Based on the foregoing brief review of existing attempts to measure the presence of 
mafia in Italy, this subsection analyses the current state of the art and identifies the 
problems with such research. 
                                                 
 
31
 Rates of mafia murder 1996-2004; rates of mafia-type associations 1995-2004; rates of city 
councils dissolved for mafia infiltration 1991-2007; rates of assets confiscated from organised 
crime 1998-2007; rates of offences connected with public procurement (corresponding to the 
offences envisaged by Article 640-bis, 316-bis, 316-ter, 353 of the Italian Criminal Code and 
Article 53-bis of Legislative Decree 22/1997). All rates are per 100,000 inhabitants, except 
city councils (rate per 100 councils in the province). 
32 
In some cases, in order to reduce the impact of outlier values for some indicators, provinces 
with outlier values were assigned the same rate as the province with the second higher rate. 
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Some of the measurements considered do not allow comparison among 
different areas. This is the case of the OCI compiled by ISTAT, which measures 
regional trends compared to their level in 1995. The OCI cannot be used to assess 
whether there is more organised crime in Sicily than, for example, in Calabria or 
Veneto.
33
 Surprisingly, Caruso seemed unaware of the nature of the OCI and 
compared the trends of the OCI among Italian regions, analysing its relation with 
certain socio-economic variables.
34
.  
 
The measurements reviewed are frequently made at the regional level or do 
not include all Italian provinces. In the former case, the analysis is limited to regions, 
which are relatively large areas and may comprise very different socio-economic and 
criminal contexts. Most of the measurements reviewed above were at regional level. 
Some studies conducted analysis at the provincial level (IPM, Censis, Mennella, 
Daniele and Marani, Calderoni and Caneppele) but only the studies by Mennella and 
Daniele and Marani analysed all the Italian provinces.  
Most of the studies reviewed used data covering a limited time span. This may 
significantly affect the perception and measurement of the mafia. The latter, in fact, is 
an enduring and complex system which can hardly be measured with data relative to 
one or two years. Constructing an index with data limited to only a few years may 
prove problematic, given that the presence of the mafia lasts and changes over time 
periods longer than a calendar year. This problem affects most of the studies and 
                                                 
 
33
 For example, the OCI for Sicily in 2006 is 48.3 while for Umbria (a small central region) is 
304.3.  
34
 Since the OCI measures the regional trend compared to 1995 (1995=100), its use for a 
statistical analysis across Italian regions appears unclear and potentially misleading. Indeed, 
the OCI measures whether the presence of organised crime has increased compared to 1995 in 
a given region and does not allow to compare to regional trends. 
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indexes cited above. The ISTAT OCI, the Eurispes IPM, Centorrino and Ofria, 
Mennella and Lavezzi used yearly data from one year to construct their indexes. 
Daniele and Marani, Censis used data covering three or four years. 
In some cases, the geographical scope and the variables used have changed 
among different editions of the measurements. This applies especially to the IPM, and 
it affects the possibility of comparing the IPM 2004 with the other editions (2005, 
2007, 2008, 2010) in order to analyse the trends of the provinces.
35
 
The variable selection is frequently problematic, and there is a significant 
variety among the measurements reviewed. First, the variables selected do not always 
directly concern organised crime. For example, data on bomb or fire attacks, usury or 
money-laundering include crimes not committed by the mafias. Although it may be 
assumed that the mafia commits a proportion of these offences, the current data 
comprise crimes committed by single individuals as well as by mafia organisations. 
There is no information about the actual share of mafia-related offences for each 
selected crime. Furthermore, the share of mafia-related arsons may be different from 
the share of mafia-related usury or robbery. For this reason the use of such data to 
measure the presence of the mafia may provide unreliable information. In some cases, 
moreover, the measurements include indirect crimes and exclude offences more 
directly related with the mafia. For example, the ISTAT OCI includes arsons and 
serious robberies, but it excludes mafia-type associations. Second, some specific types 
of crime suffer from a very high ‘dark figure’ (i.e. unreported crimes), so that the 
official statistics are not likely to reflect the actual distribution of crimes, but rather 
                                                 
 
35
 For example, in the ranking of the IPM 2004 Crotone was the last province of Calabria. In 
2005 the IPM 2005 Eurispes included mafia murders in the index. Crotone ranked first in 
IPM 2005. 
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the population’s propensity to report them. For this reason these data are extremely 
unreliable and should be analysed with great caution. Extortion is a typical example. 
The threat of retaliation for reporting extortion to the police is very serious when it 
involves a mafia group, because it is relatively certain, immediate and may imply 
serious damage, including death. It is consequently likely that, in areas where 
organised crime exerts strong control over the territory, data on extortion are severely 
underestimated.
36
 For these reasons, the official data on extortion are probably 
distorted, underestimating the distribution of the offence in provinces under the close 
control of mafia-type associations. Other provinces may have higher rates, although 
this may be due to a higher propensity to report among victims, perhaps encouraged 
by less pervasive control of the area by criminal organizations. Despite the 
importance of extortion in the dynamics of the mafia, data on extortion should be 
analysed with extreme care and not be considered as furnishing direct measures of 
mafia presence. The above-reviewed attempts to measure the presence of mafia 
frequently overlooked the difficulties involved in the use of official crime statistics, 
and they did not verify whether the variables selected were directly and reliably 
related to the mafia. There is no discussion on the selection of the variables and no 
analysis of the possible problems relative to the use of these data.
37
  
The procedures for calculating the measurements exhibit various problems. 
The IPM by Eurispes included data in absolute values for the number of phone 
interceptions in the provinces. This severely affected comparability among the 
                                                 
 
36
 Daniele, “Organized crime and regional development. A review of the Italian case,” 227; 
Asmundo and Lisciandra, “Un tentativo di stima del costo delle estorsioni sulle imprese a 
livello regionale: il caso Sicilia,” 117; Caneppele and Calderoni, “Extortion Rackets in 
Europe: An Exploratory Comparative Study.” 
37
 In another study, Daniele examines the problems of measuring extortion and mafia in Italy. 
See Daniele, “Organized crime and regional development. A review of the Italian case,” 227. 
 17 
provinces, because larger and more densely populated provinces are likely to have 
more interceptions than smaller ones. It is not surprising that the biggest cities, such 
as Napoli, Palermo and Reggio Calabria, appear at the top of the IPM. It is widely 
acknowledged that comparison among variables whose distribution is affected by the 
size of the population studied is achieved by calculating rates. In this case, the rate per 
100,000 inhabitants, or better per phone lines, would have yielded comparable 
information. Moreover, the ISTAT calculates the OCI by summing the absolute 
values for the crimes selected and weighting them for the average statutory penalty. 
This is an attempt to consider the severity of different crimes. However, the average 
statutory penalty does not seem to be the most appropriate criterion in this case. In the 
absence of reliable statistics enabling calculation of the averages of the actual 
penalties inflicted for each offence, probably the maximum statutory penalty would 
have been a better (and simpler) alternative. For example, if crime A is punished with 
up to 10 years of imprisonment and crime B is punished with between 4 and 8 years, 
the ISTAT procedure would give weighting factors of 5 and 6 respectively, implying 
that crime A should be considered less serious than crime B. Probably, most people 
would judge the matter in reverse, arguing that crime A is more serious than crime 
B.
38
 Moreover, this procedure does not seem preferable to alternative weighting 
systems.
39
 
                                                 
 
38
 In any case, the letter of the law as an estimate of the seriousness of a crime is an extreme 
simplification which does not consider that criminal law has elements allowing 
parameterization of the penalty to the actual seriousness of a crime (e.g. aggravating or 
attenuating circumstances, discretionary powers of the court). Therefore the statutory penalty 
is merely a starting point and the final applicable penalty may significantly differ from it.  
39 
For example, a 1-3 seriousness scale where the researchers would assess the seriousness of 
each offences according to various factors (possibly including the penalties provided by the 
law). 
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 Other measurements sum the different variables and subsequently calculate 
the rates. This procedure is inevitably affected by the overall values of the summed 
crimes. For example, in 2008 the police reported to the judicial authorities 104 mafia 
murders, 6646 extortions, 10728 cases of damage followed by arson, and 34082 drug 
offences.
40
 It is clear that the sum of the provincial values will be most influenced by 
drug and damage followed by arson offences. This implies that very frequent and 
generic (not directly mafia-connected) offences are mixed with crimes which are 
direct signals of mafia presence, such as mafia-type murder. The indexes by 
Mennella, Daniele and Marani and ISTAT (with the above-criticized weighting 
system) adopted this mechanism. In practice, these indexes reflect the distribution of 
the most numerous crimes, which are frequently the ones more indirectly (if ever) 
related to the mafia. 
Analysis of the existing attempts to measure the presence of the mafia in Italy 
highlights several problems and issues. These relate to the selection of the variables 
most directly related to the mafia, to the geographical and chronological scope of the 
data analysed, and to the procedures used to calculate the index. All the measurements 
reviewed exhibit one or more problems relating to these points. Surprisingly, the 
current literature does not provide a measurement of the presence of the mafia in 
Italy, notwithstanding the wealth of studies examining the mafia from multiple 
perspectives. The studies reviewed confirm this lack of knowledge: they acknowledge 
dissatisfaction with the current measurements and argue that ‘the measurement of 
organised crime would therefore require a specific study’.41 
                                                 
 
40
 Data are available on the ISTAT website “Justice in Figures”: giustiziaincifre.istat.it 
41
 Lavezzi, “Economic structure and vulnerability to organised crime,” 206. 
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The present study aims to fill this gap by creating the Mafia Index (MI), which 
is designed in particular to: 
 accurately select the most directly mafia-related variables 
 cover a prolonged time span 
 provide scores at the provincial level 
 use a clear calculation procedure accounting for the different values and 
distributions of the selected variables.  
 
2. The creation of the Mafia Index 
A methodology based on three steps was used to create the MI. The first step defined 
the concept of mafia and devised an operational definition comprising multiple 
dimensions (2.1). The second step identified possible indicators for each dimension 
and operationalized them (2.2). The third step created the MI by combining the 
variables selected (0).  
2.1. The different dimensions of the mafia 
The concept of mafia is an extremely complex one, and the literature has offered a 
number of definitions from different epistemological perspectives. However, defining 
the mafia would fall outside the scope of this study, which relies for its purposes on 
two main definitions of ‘mafia’. The first is the well-known legal definition of ‘mafia-
type association’ provided by Article 416-bis of the Italian Criminal Code. Paragraph 
3 of the provision defines the ‘metodo mafioso’ (mafia method) and the goals of the 
mafia as follows:  
‘An association is of mafia-type when its members exploit the potential for 
intimidation which their membership gives them, and the consequent 
subjection and omertà to commit offences, or to assume, directly or indirectly, 
the management or control of financial activities, concessions, permissions, 
enterprises and public services, or for the purpose of deriving profit or 
wrongful advantages for themselves or others, or to hamper or to prevent 
during public elections the free exercise of the right to vote or to obtain votes 
for themselves or for others (author’s translation)’. 
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The second definition is the ‘paradigm of complexity’. This is a sociological 
definition which describes the mafia as ‘a system of violence and illegality that aims 
to accumulate wealth and to obtain positions of power; which also uses a cultural code 
and which enjoys a certain popular support’.42 Some other scholars in Italy and abroad 
have adopted or aligned with the paradigm of complexity,
43
 which among its various 
implications postulates that ‘mafia’ is a complex, multifaceted concept. 44  
Based on these two definitions, both of which highlight the complexity of the 
mafia and the variety of its activities and functions, this study adopts the following 
operational definition of mafia: a criminal system characterised by the presence of 
criminal groups providing illicit goods and services, using violence, threat or 
intimidation, and infiltrating the political and the economic system. This definition 
includes elements present in both Article 416-bis and the paradigm of complexity: the 
provision of illicit goods and services recalls the aim of  ‘deriving profit or wrongful 
advantages’ from the criminal offence, and the accumulation of wealth recalls the 
paradigm of complexity. The use of violence, threat or intimidation is mentioned both 
in the Criminal Code (‘potential for intimidation’) and by the paradigm of complexity 
(‘a system of violence and illegality’). The relation with the political system is 
implicit in one the mafia-type association’s goals, that of interfering with elections, 
and in the aim ‘of obtaining positions of power’ highlighted by the paradigm of 
complexity. Infiltration of the economic system is listed by Article 416-bis among the 
objectives of a mafia-type association (the management of economic activities), and it 
                                                 
 
42
 Santino, “Mafia and Mafia-type organizations in Italy,” 87; Santino, Dalla Mafia Alle 
Mafie. 
43
 Armao, Il Sistema Mafia; Paoli and Fijnaut, “Introduction to Part I: The History of the 
Concept,” 31; Allum and Siebert, “Organized crime: a threat to democracy?,” 17; Scalia, 
“From the octopus to the spider?,” 6. 
44
 Santino, “Mafia and Mafia-type organizations in Italy,” 87. 
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can be considered a consequence of the definition of the paradigm of complexity, 
which points up the objectives of power and profit and the enjoyment of ‘a certain 
popular support’.  
According to this operational definition, the mafia has four main dimensions: 
 presence of criminal groups providing illicit goods and services 
 use of violence, threat or intimidation 
 infiltration of the political system 
 infiltration of the economic system. 
2.2. The selection of the variables 
On the basis of a systematic review of the literature of existing attempts to measure 
the presence of mafia in Italy, and of available data sources, selection was made of  a 
number of possible indicators and related variables with which to measure the above 
four dimensions.
45
 
Table 7 lists the four dimensions, the indicators identified within each 
dimension, the variables measuring each indicator and the available years. Two 
variables (“Number of mafia-type associations identified by the investigative 
authorities” and “Offence of mafia-politics vote-trading reported by the police to the 
prosecution service”) were not available. 
                                                 
 
45
 In Italy, there are no victimization surveys or other periodic surveys measuring the presence 
or the perception of mafias (like, for example, the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index). Such surveys would provide important information with which to 
complement existing data (See Caneppele and Calderoni, “Extortion Rackets in Europe: An 
Exploratory Comparative Study.”). Although these sources have problems (sampling, 
memories of the respondents, costs), they have been used for the analysis of organised crime 
(see van Dijk, “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact upon Societies.”). 
The only existing survey is the Italian Business Crime Survey conducted by the Italian 
Ministry of Interior and Transcrime in 2008 (see Mugellini, “Measuring crime against 
business in the EU: the problem of comparability,” 89. This survey has also covered offences 
related to organised crime (e.g. corruption, extortion), but results are available only at 
regional level and have not yet been officially published (see Mugellini, “The Victimization 
of Businesses in Italy: key results.” 
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Table 7. Dimensions, indicators and variables for the Mafia Index 
Dimension Indicator Variable Period 
Presence of 
criminal 
groups 
providing 
illicit goods 
and services 
Presence of mafia-type associations Mafia-type associations 
a 
1983-2008 
Presence of mafia-type associations 
Offences of mafia-type associations 
indicted by the prosecution service
b
 
1994-2003 
Presence of mafia-type associations 
Number of mafia-type associations 
identified by the investigative 
authorities
c
 
N/a 
Presence of criminal associations Criminal associations 
a 
1983-2008 
Drug trafficking Drug offences
a
 1983-2008 
Prostitution Exploitation of prostitution
a
 1983-2008 
Usury Usury
a
 2004-2007 
Counterfeiting Counterfeiting
a
 2004-2007 
Smuggling Smuggling
a
 2004-2007 
Trafficking of waste 
Organised activity for the illicit 
trafficking of waste
a
 
2002-2009 
Use of 
violence, 
threat or 
intimidation 
Homicidal violence Mafia murders
a
 1983-2008 
Homicidal violence Attempted mafia murders
a
 2004-2007 
Instrumental violence Extortions
a
 1983-2008 
Instrumental violence Kidnappings for ransom
a
 1983-2007 
Instrumental violence Arsons
a
 1983-2008 
Instrumental violence Damage followed by arson
a
 1983-2008 
Instrumental violence Bomb or fire attacks
a
 1983-2008 
Infiltration 
of the 
political 
system 
Infiltration of local governments 
City councils dissolved for infiltration 
by organised crime
d
 
1991-2009 
Infiltration of elections mafia-politics vote-trading
a
 N/a 
Infiltration 
of the 
economic 
system 
Infiltration of public procurement Offences related to public procurement
b
 2003-2005 
Money-laundering Money-laundering
a
 2004-2007 
Investments by the mafia 
Assets confiscated from organised 
crime
e
 
1983-2009 
a
 Offences reported by the police to the prosecution service. Operational database for Italian law 
enforcement agencies. Until 2003 this database was known as ‘modello 165’, while since 2004 a new 
system (‘SDI’ acronym for Sistema di Indagine) has replaced the previous one. 
b
 Territorial Information System on Justice database compiled by ISTAT and Ministry of Justice.  
c- d
 Ministry of Interior data 
e
 Agenzia del Demanio data 
f 
data from Legambiente, Rapporto Ecomafia 
Source: author’s compilation 
Subsequently, the selected and available variables were analysed according to 
three criteria. Table 8 presents the variables selected according to these criteria. 
The first selection criterion was the availability of data for a sufficiently long 
period of time. This criterion may appear trivial, but it has important implications. As 
argued above, a mafia is an established and long lasting criminal system. To measure 
its presence in the Italian territory it is necessary to take account of this persistent and 
continuous nature. Therefore, the selection of data for a limited time period may 
affect the analysis of the phenomenon and distort perception of it. The data collected 
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for the study had different time spans. Long time series were available for 12 
variables (at least 19 years available). For 8 variables, data were available for shorter 
periods (between 3 and 10 years).  
The second selection criteria was content validity.
46
 Each identified variable 
was checked for its content validity, i.e. how it reflected one or more dimensions of 
the operational definition of mafia. This criterion paid particular attention to how the 
variable directly reflected mafia activities. Some variables were directly and 
univocally related to the mafia. This was the case, for example, of mafia-type 
associations or mafia murders. Clearly, these variables measured phenomena which 
were directly related to the concept of mafia. By contrast, some of the variables 
identified were not directly and univocally related to the mafia: for example, statistics 
on drug offences, money-laundering and extortion. It was impossible to know from 
the data available whether the suspects/perpetrators of these offences were related to 
the mafia (e.g. as members or other partners) or isolated single criminals. It is 
legitimate to hypothesize that these offences are frequently committed by criminal 
organizations, and even by the mafias. Indeed, most of the studies reviewed earlier did 
so. However, it is impossible to establish the share of the total offences actually 
committed within mafia groups and not by single individuals. Further, the ‘mafia 
share’ may vary from offence to offence. For this reason, variables not directly and 
univocally related to the mafia did not pass the test for content validity. The reason for 
their exclusion was to avoid the use of data whose connection with the mafia was only 
partial and unclear. Among the available variables, only six were directly related to 
                                                 
 
46 Content validity refers to how “the measure covers the full range of the concept’s meaning”. 
Bachman and Schutt, The Practice of Research in Criminology and Criminal Justice, 95. 
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the mafia.
47
 The other variables (n. 14) were not directly and univocally related to the 
mafia. 
The third selection criterion  consisted in criterion validity.
48
 Each identified 
variable was analysed, verifying its statistical correlation with the other variables (see 
Annex I. Table 11. Correlation matrix for the correlation matrix). Among the 
identified variables, 13 variables had a positive (Pearson’s r > 0.3) and statistically 
significant correlation with at least half of the other variables.
49
 Seven variables were 
not correlated to any other variables (exploitation of prostitution, drug crimes and 
waste trafficking) or were correlated to between one and four variables 
(counterfeiting, money-laundering, smuggling and usury).  
                                                 
 
47
 Mafia type associations (reported by the police), Assets confiscated from organised crime, 
Mafia murders, City councils dissolved for infiltration by organised crime, Mafia type 
associations (indicted by the prosecution) and attempted mafia murders. 
48
 Criterion validity refers to how “the scores obtained on one measure can be compared to 
those obtained with a more direct or already validated measure of the phenomenon (the 
criterion)”. Bachman and Schutt, The Practice of Research in Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, 95. 
49
 Criminal association correlated to 16 other variables; extortion and city councils dissolved 
for organised crime infiltration to 13; mafia-type association (police reported), mafia murders, 
assets confiscated to organised crime, mafia type association (indicted), attempted mafia 
murders, damage followed by arson, bomb or fire attacks, arsons and offences related to 
public procurement to 12; and kidnapping for ransom to 11.  
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Table 8. Selection of the variables for the MI 
Dimension Variable Time period Content 
validity 
Criterion 
validity 
Presence of 
criminal 
groups 
providing 
illicit goods 
and services 
Mafia-type associations
 
26 years Yes Yes 
Mafia-type associations 10 years Yes Yes 
Criminal associations
 
26 years No Yes 
Drug offences 26 years No No 
Exploitation of prostitution 26 years No No 
Usury 4 years No No 
Counterfeiting 4 years No No 
Smuggling 4 years No No 
Organised activity for the illicit trafficking of 
waste 
8 years No No 
Use of 
violence, 
threat or 
intimidation 
Mafia murders 26 years Yes Yes 
Attempted mafia murders 4 years Yes Yes 
Extortions 26 years No Yes 
Kidnapping for ransom 25 years No Yes 
Arsons 26 years No Yes 
Damage followed by arson 26 years No Yes 
Bomb or fire attacks 26 years No Yes 
Infiltration 
of the 
political 
system 
City councils dissolved for infiltration by 
organised crime 
19 years Yes Yes 
Infiltration 
of the 
economic 
system 
Offences related to public procurement 3 years No Yes 
Money-laundering 4 years No No 
Assets confiscated from organised crime 27 years Yes Yes 
Source: author’s compilation 
2.3. The creation of the Mafia Index 
Based on the above-described selection procedure, only four variables that 
successfully passed the three selection criteria were included in the Mafia Index. They 
were:  
 mafia-type associations  
 mafia murders 
 city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration  
 assets confiscated from organised crime.  
 
Each of the variables selected covered a different dimension of the operational 
concept of mafia identified in 2.1. Consequently, the MI measures all four dimensions 
of the mafia.  
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The literature has frequently adopted one or more of the variables selected as a 
reliable proxy for the presence of mafias.
50
 Indeed, the presence of a mafia-type 
association (reported by the police to the prosecution service) reflects the actual 
presence of a criminal group operating in a given province. The commission of a 
mafia murder shows that the mafias have some form of control, or at least are able to 
reach their targets with relative ease. The dissolution of a city council and the 
presence of assets confiscated from organised crime are reliable proxies for 
infiltration of the political and economic systems. Although the four variables 
satisfied the three selection criteria and are frequently used in studies on the Italian 
mafias, they cannot be considered immune to problems. Indeed, it is widely 
acknowledged that official/administrative crime statistics should be used with great 
caution, especially for non-conventional crimes such as mafia-related ones.
51
 These, 
in fact, sources may reflect the efforts and performance of the criminal justice system 
rather than the actual trends of the crimes. The variables included in the MI are no 
exception. However, some elements suggest that these variables are sufficiently 
reliable. For example, mafia murders should have a limited dark figure. In some cases 
mafias may conceal the murders that they commit, for example by resorting to the so 
called ‘lupara bianca’, which consists in concealment of the victim’s corpse, thus 
impeding the detection and investigation of the murder. More frequently, however, 
mafias do not conceal their murders. Indeed, the exercise of homicidal violence emits 
                                                 
 
50
 Most of the indexes and studies reviewed in 1.1 used one or more of the selected variables 
to measure the presence of mafias in Italy. Other publications have focused on one specific 
indicator among those selected. See Chinnici and Santino, La violenza programmata : omicidi 
e guerre di mafia a Palermo dagli anni ’60 ad oggi; Chinnici, “L'omicidio a Palermo”; Mete, 
Fuori dal comune; Trocchia, Federalismo Criminale: Viaggio nei comuni sciolti per mafia; 
Talamo, “Appendice: Alcuni dati sui patrimoni mafiosi.” 
51
 Caneppele and Calderoni, “Extortion Rackets in Europe: An Exploratory Comparative 
Study.” 
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a very strong signal of the power and control exerted by the mafias. Once the decision 
to murder has been taken, mafias may want to maximize its effects, making it 
generally known that they are capable of killing their enemies. Therefore, this variable 
does not appear to be excessively influenced by the performance of the criminal 
justice system; rather, it is likely to reflect the actual distribution of mafia murders 
across the national territory. The other variables show an extremely strong correlation 
with mafia murders and among them (see below and Table 11 in Annex). This very 
probably confirms that provinces with high values on one variable also have high 
values on the other three variables. Furthermore, the variables of the MI cover a time 
span of nearly thirty years (except for city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration, a 
variable which covers the 1991-2009 period). In such a (relatively) long time period, 
it appears difficult to argue that the highest values of a province are due to a 
systematic outperformance (or underperformance) of the criminal justice system in 
that province. Obviously, these elements do not completely dispel the risk that the 
variables depict the performance of the criminal justice system, at least in part. 
However, it appears justifiable to assume that the values of the variables selected 
primarily reflect the distribution of mafia-related phenomena and only marginally the 
performance of the Italian criminal justice system. The scores of the MI substantially 
confirm this assumption (see below, Section 3).  
Two different procedures were adopted to calculate the MI. The first of them 
(MI (rate)) calculated the average of the annual rates for each variable and for each 
province.
52
 It then normalized the rates, attributing the score of 100 to the province 
                                                 
 
52
 Rates for mafia-type associations, murders and for confiscated assets are per 100,000 
inhabitants in the province; rates for city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration are per 100 
city councils in the province.  
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with the highest average rate. The average of the scores for each indicator provided 
the final score for each province (third column in Table 9, ‘Mafia index (rate)’). 
The Mafia Index (rate) measures the presence of mafia in the Italian 
provinces, but it is greatly affected by the unequal distribution of the variables 
analysed. Indeed, all four indicators were extremely concentrated in a limited number 
of provinces, with the highest rates very distant from the average and median rates 
(see Annex I, Figure 1 to Figure 4). 
The concentrated distribution of the selected variables may jeopardise a 
satisfactory estimation of the actual presence of the mafia on the Italian territory. In 
particular, it may overestimate the presence of the mafia in a few provinces of 
Southern Italy. These are the original areas of mafia-type organisations, and it is 
therefore not surprising that they show high rates on the indicators selected. For this 
reason, crimes and data may overestimate the presence of the mafia, while for other 
provinces it may be more difficult to attribute a crime to a mafia-type group. 
Moreover, given the traditional presence of mafia-type groups, these areas are also the 
target of extremely intensive law enforcement operations. Consequently, the figures 
reflecting police reports and other data may be higher owing to better performance by 
and/or more numerous law enforcement personnel. In general, the variables selected 
have very low values, since the crimes are relatively rare and complex (compared, for 
example, with robbery or theft). Hence even a very low rate (compared with other 
crimes) may still be an important signal of mafia presence in a given province. To 
measure the presence of mafia in Italy better, it may be more useful to focus on each 
province’s rank among all Italian provinces. This approach makes it possible to off-
set the problems relating to the distribution of the selected variables.  
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For these reasons,  a second calculation procedure was developed.  This was 
the MI (rank), which was based on the rank of each province among all the Italian 
provinces for each indicator, instead of the average of the annual rates. For each 
indicator, the MI (rank) calculated the average of the annual rates for each province. It 
then ranked all the Italian provinces in decreasing order. It attributed the score of 100 
to the province with the highest rank, and proportionally lower scores to the other 
provinces, according to their rank. The average score for each indicator provided the 
MI for each province (fourth column in Table 9, ‘MI (rank)’).  
The two procedures yielded very closely correlated provincial scores.
53
 The 
provinces with the highest rate (first procedure) ranked high also in the second 
procedure. However, the impact of the outliers was reduced and the overall 
distribution of the provinces was less concentrated.  
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 Pearson’s r was 0.895 and statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 9. The Mafia Index 
MI 
Rank 
Province 
MI 
(rate)
a
  
MI 
(rank)
b
  
MI 
Rank 
Province 
MI 
(rate)
a
  
MI 
(rank)
b
  
1 Reggio Calabria 80.58 98.32 53 Genova 1.13 12.67 
2 Napoli 47.28 87.03 54 L'aquila 0.88 12.52 
3 Caserta 35.33 84.73 55 Bologna 0.91 12.43 
4 Caltanissetta 42.20 84.50 56 Lucca 0.96 12.43 
5 Palermo 50.37 83.22 57 Trento 0.78 11.66 
6 Catania 32.12 82.50 58 Pavia 0.75 11.54 
7 Crotone 34.11 81.22 59 Macerata 0.90 10.81 
8 Trapani 29.42 77.86 60 Asti 0.88 10.70 
9 Catanzaro 32.83 76.97 61 Belluno 0.80 10.48 
10 Vibo Valentia 26.08 74.13 62 Ferrara 0.62 10.14 
11 Agrigento 23.52 71.75 63 Arezzo 0.86 9.63 
12 Ragusa 17.83 61.82 64 Bergamo 0.70 9.18 
13 Messina 15.44 60.82 65 Trieste 0.66 9.18 
14 Enna 17.21 57.74 66 Pesaro Urbino 0.52 9.16 
15 Salerno 12.02 57.65 67 Pistoia 0.58 8.53 
16 Bari 12.83 55.72 68 Lodi 0.58 8.21 
17 Siracusa 12.74 50.71 69 Nuoro 0.55 7.35 
18 Lecce 7.50 48.76 70 Padova 0.70 7.25 
19 Brindisi 11.85 47.11 71 Modena 0.92 7.16 
20 Avellino 8.06 46.29 72 Udine 0.57 7.03 
21 Cosenza 7.22 44.10 73 Livorno 0.86 6.95 
22 Matera 6.99 39.75 74 Ravenna 0.59 6.92 
23 Foggia 4.56 36.64 75 Cremona 0.61 6.71 
24 Taranto 5.91 35.25 76 Pescara 0.62 6.39 
25 Benevento 5.16 34.80 77 Parma 0.53 6.17 
26 Latina 4.30 34.16 78 Viterbo 0.54 6.17 
27 Roma 2.92 27.89 79 Reggio Emilia 0.67 6.07 
28 Novara 4.53 25.24 80 Alessandria 0.43 5.94 
29 Milano 2.53 24.93 81 Mantova 0.45 5.94 
30 Como 2.16 24.10 82 Grosseto 0.41 5.62 
31 Torino 1.71 23.68 83 Isernia 0.49 5.62 
32 Sassari 1.54 21.68 84 Sondrio 0.38 5.40 
33 Verbano Cusio Oss. 2.05 21.53 85 Ascoli Piceno 0.50 4.87 
34 Teramo 1.89 21.08 86 Rovigo 0.43 4.87 
35 Lecco 4.05 20.69 87 Ancona 0.54 4.67 
36 Brescia 1.92 20.50 88 Massa Carrara 0.56 4.35 
37 Potenza 1.98 20.35 89 Vercelli 0.22 4.31 
38 Rimini 1.67 19.79 90 Cuneo 0.28 4.10 
39 Frosinone 1.74 19.58 91 Siena 0.26 4.10 
40 Imperia 1.64 19.04 92 Pisa 0.38 3.90 
41 Varese 1.55 18.07 93 Perugia 0.47 3.69 
42 Venezia 1.47 17.84 94 Oristano 0.34 3.67 
43 Savona 1.44 16.66 95 Vicenza 0.39 3.15 
44 Piacenza 1.26 14.60 96 Treviso 0.35 3.04 
45 Gorizia 2.37 14.54 97 Rieti 0.39 2.72 
46 La Spezia 1.30 14.39 98 Chieti 0.32 2.60 
47 Firenze 1.58 14.21 99 Prato 0.15 2.59 
48 Cagliari 0.98 13.72 100 Bolzano 0.25 1.63 
49 Verona 1.02 13.72 101 Terni 0.25 1.63 
50 Aosta 1.26 13.64 102 Pordenone 0.10 0.54 
51 Forli' 0.83 13.59 103 Biella 0.00 0.00 
52 Campobasso 1.44 12.80     
a
 Average of the scores on the four indicators (for each indicator, the max average annual rate=100) 
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b
 Average of the scores on the four indicators (for each indicator, the highest rank=100) 
Source: author’s calculations 
To verify the overall quality and reliability of the MI,  another measurement, 
including other variables in the index, was performed. This index (Mafia Index 
Enlarged, or MIen) included all the variables which had satisfied at least two of the 
three selection criteria (availability for a long period, content validity, and criterion 
validity). The selection of the variables for the MIen was more flexible and included 
variables which presented some issues relating to their availability, their direct 
relation with the mafia, and their statistical correlation with the other variables(see 
above Table 8). The variables composing the MIen were: 
 mafia-type associations  
 mafia murders 
 city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration  
 assets confiscated from organised crime  
 criminal associations 
 attempted mafia murders 
 extortions 
 kidnapping for ransom 
 arsons 
 damage followed by arson 
 bomb or fire attacks. 
 
The same calculation procedures were used to create the MIen (rate) and the 
MIen (rank) (See Table 10). Once again the two procedures yielded provincial scores 
with high correlations.
54
 
                                                 
 
54
 Pearson’s r was 0.918 and statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
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Table 10. Mafia Index Enlarged (MIen) 
MIen 
Rank 
Province 
MIen 
(rate)
a
  
MIen 
(rank)
b
  
MIen 
Rank 
Province 
MIen 
(rate)
a
  
MIen 
(rank)
b
  
1 Reggio Calabria 75.29 96.96 53 Lecco 8.25 26.71 
2 Vibo Valentia 55.06 87.92 54 Savona 9.48 25.75 
3 Catanzaro 50.00 87.46 55 Trieste 10.33 25.29 
4 Caltanissetta 56.33 85.78 56 Pistoia 9.54 25.20 
5 Crotone 46.91 85.51 57 Como 7.10 24.65 
6 Catania 36.72 81.11 58 Gorizia 10.79 24.34 
7 Napoli 38.70 75.46 59 Prato 16.41 24.03 
8 Caserta 31.19 73.94 60 Massa Carrara 9.09 24.01 
9 Trapani 29.69 70.11 61 Aosta 9.92 23.33 
10 Agrigento 25.24 69.49 62 Trento 7.69 23.18 
11 Palermo 34.99 68.4 63 Livorno 10.10 22.26 
12 Messina 28.37 67.89 64 Brescia 8.21 22.00 
13 Siracusa 30.25 67.61 65 Alessandria 8.82 21.80 
14 Brindisi 27.41 65.69 66 Padova 8.03 21.21 
15 Ragusa 25.46 63.46 67 L'aquila 8.19 20.9 
16 Bari 22.73 63.39 68 Venezia 8.33 20.80 
17 Enna 25.41 62.44 69 Bolzano 6.40 20.76 
18 Salerno 18.77 60.13 70 Sondrio 8.30 20.76 
19 Foggia 27.03 59.78 71 Viterbo 8.84 20.53 
20 Lecce 18.58 58.71 72 Vercelli 7.72 19.92 
21 Cosenza 19.25 55.69 73 Arezzo 8.27 19.90 
22 Taranto 17.72 52.18 74 Rovigo 8.77 19.54 
23 Benevento 17.89 50.42 75 Ascoli Piceno 8.80 19.38 
24 Matera 16.13 50.38 76 Ravenna 8.15 19.13 
25 Avellino 15.13 50.13 77 Bergamo 7.85 18.9 
26 Latina 17.36 48.22 78 Macerata 9.04 18.75 
27 Rimini 21.80 42.39 79 Pesaro Urbino 8.46 17.87 
28 Sassari 14.76 41.60 80 Terni 8.82 17.66 
29 Nuoro 26.34 40.68 81 Siena 8.31 16.16 
30 Potenza 14.09 40.20 82 Rieti 8.00 15.69 
31 Imperia 13.54 40.00 83 Verona 6.89 15.60 
32 Roma 12.52 36.18 84 Udine 6.87 15.20 
33 Biella 14.58 35.01 85 Pisa 7.75 14.76 
34 Isernia 12.90 34.87 86 Chieti 7.41 14.51 
35 Asti 12.91 34.13 87 Piacenza 6.84 14.14 
36 Cagliari 12.93 34.11 88 Pavia 6.19 13.84 
37 Teramo 13.77 33.47 89 Ancona 7.70 13.30 
38 Novara 9.58 33.15 90 Perugia 7.36 13.16 
39 Pescara 12.88 32.85 91 Lodi 5.19 13.01 
40 Frosinone 12.30 32.23 92 Pordenone 6.41 12.76 
41 Bologna 12.41 31.98 93 Ferrara 7.22 12.52 
42 Campobasso 11.72 31.57 94 Reggio Emilia 6.85 12.38 
43 Torino 10.76 31.32 95 Grosseto 5.55 12.15 
44 Lucca 9.97 30.47 96 Belluno 5.53 11.93 
45 Varese 9.41 29.82 97 Modena 6.72 11.58 
46 La Spezia 11.46 29.35 98 Cuneo 7.10 11.40 
47 Verbano Cusio Oss. 9.43 29.04 99 Mantova 5.96 10.77 
48 Milano 9.65 28.99 100 Parma 5.53 9.43 
49 Forli' 11.93 28.69 101 Cremona 5.92 8.05 
50 Oristano 12.95 27.69 102 Vicenza 6.12 7.80 
51 Genova 10.32 27.12 103 Treviso 5.32 6.98 
52 Firenze 10.27 27.06     
a
 Average of the scores on the eleven indicators (for each indicator, the max average annual rate=100) 
b
 Average of the scores on the eleven indicators (for each indicator, the highest rank=100) 
Source: author’s calculations 
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3. Analysis of the Mafia Index 
The MI and the MIen yielded very similar results (Maps 2 to 4), with closely 
correlated scores.
55
 This may be due to the fact that the MIen included variables 
which were present in the MI. However, the correlation was confirmed, albeit at a 
slightly lower level, also if the MI was compared with the set of variables included 
only in the MIen.
56
 This shows that both indexes converged in measuring the same 
phenomenon. The MI and the MIen did not differ significantly. The more rigorous 
selection of the variables of the MI did not exclude from the MI important patterns of 
mafia presence that may have been included through other variables.  
Map 2. Mafia Index (rate) – Map 3 Mafia Index (rank)* 
 
*Classes created through Jenks Natural Breaks Classification 
Source: author’s calculations 
The MI thus appears to be a reliable index measuring the presence of mafia at 
the provincial level. The inclusion of other variables, as tested in the MIen, does not 
affect the provincial scores and their distribution in a significant way. Furthermore, 
the MI is a relatively simple index, in that it is composed of only four variables. This 
makes it easier to calculate and update. However, the variables selected satisfy all 
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 Pearson’s r was 0.903 for the MI (rate) and MIen (rate) and 0.941 for the MI (rank) and 
MIen (rank). Both correlations were statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
56
 Pearson’s r was 0.788 for the rate procedure and 0.856 rank procedure. Both correlations 
were statistically significant at 0.01 level.  
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three selection criteria, namely availability for a prolonged period, direct relation with 
the mafia, and criterion validity. The four variables of the MI are strongly correlated 
with each other (see Annex I Table 11 for the correlations; for the MI, Cronbach’s 
alpha= 0.908).
57
 
Map 4. Mafia Index Enlarged (rate) – Map 5. Mafia Index Enlarged (rank)* 
  
*Classes created through Jenks Natural Breaks Classification 
Source: author’s calculations 
For the above reasons, and for the purpose of this study, it seems appropriate 
to adopt the MI and discard the MIen. Indeed, the MIen consists of more variables, 
available for shorter periods and less directly related to the mafia. 
Maps 2 and 3 show the distribution of the MI across Italian provinces. The 
presence of the mafia appears to be concentrated in some Southern Italian provinces: 
in particular, the provinces of Naples and Caserta (Campania), Southern Calabria 
(Reggio Calabria, Vibo Valentia, Crotone and Catanzaro) and Western Sicily 
(Palermo, Trapani, Agrigento, Caltanissetta) and Catania have high values in the 
index. These results confirm the extensive literature (both scientific studies and public 
reports) identifying those areas as most affected by the presence of mafia-type 
                                                 
 
57
 van Dijk, “Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impact upon Societies,” 42. 
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organisations.
58
 Indeed, the Camorra concentrates particularly in the provinces of 
Naples and Caserta (in which is situated the town of Casal di Principe, hometown of 
the Casalesi clan described in Roberto Saviano’s Gomorrah59).60 The ‘ndrangheta is 
historically based in Southern Calabria.
61
 Similarly, the Sicilian Mafia originated in 
the Western Sicilian provinces.
62
  
Notwithstanding the concentration in their original areas of mafia-type 
associations, many other Southern provinces record high values in the MI (rate). This 
is the case of some provinces of Apulia (Bari, Brindisi and Lecce) where the “fourth 
mafia”, the Sacra Corona Unita, arose in the 1980s.63  
The analysis of the MI (rate) in Map 2 highlights only 3 provinces with low-
medium values outside the Southern regions. These are the provinces of Novara 
(Piedmont), Lecco (Lombardy) and Latina (Lazio). However, when focusing on the 
MI (rank) in Map 3, new and more interesting patterns emerge. In particular, some 
large provinces in Central and Northern Italy, such as Rome, Milan, Turin and 
Brescia, present medium-level scores. Alongside these, some minor provinces in the 
Centre-North emerge, such as Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Novara (Piedmont), Imperia 
(Liguria), Lecco and Como (Lombardy), Rimini (Emilia-Romagna), Latina and 
Frosinone (Lazio), Teramo (Abruzzo) and Sassari (Sardinia). Several other central 
and northern provinces record values higher than that of the lowest class in Map 3. 
Although these provinces do not reach the scores of those mentioned above, they 
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 Sciarrone, Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove, 155. 
59
 Saviano, Gomorra. 
60
 Behan, The Camorra; Allum, Camorristi, Politicians, and Businessmen. 
61
 Varese, “How Mafias Migrate,” 422; Ciconte, 'Ndrangheta, 22-33. 
62
 Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia, 81-85; Paoli, “Italian Organised Crime,” 22. 
63
 Massari, La sacra corona unità. 
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further demonstrate that the mafia is present outside the regions where it originally 
developed.  
In general, several provinces of Central and Northern Italy present non-
negligible scores in the MI (rank), which highlights that the mafia cannot be 
considered a merely Southern problem affecting only economically and socially 
underdeveloped provinces; rather, it is a national problems which is significantly 
present in all the major Italian cities and several other provinces outside the South. 
These remarks should not be taken as underestimating the critical situation of many 
Southern regions and provinces. However, although the South has received much 
attention in the existing literature on the mafia, the existence of the mafia in the 
Centre and North is more disputed, particularly at the institutional level.
64 
 
4. Conclusions 
The MI is intended to be a reliable tool with which to measure the presence of 
organised crime among Italian provinces. It seeks to solve the main problems outlined 
in the review of attempts to measure the mafia in Italy.  
Firstly, the selection of the variables composing the MI followed a detailed procedure 
which operationalized the concept of mafia and provided multiple dimensions. Each 
dimension was associated with more than one possible indicator and variable. The 
variables finally selected were data available for a prolonged period, and satisfaction 
of both content and criterion validity. Moreover, they covered all the four dimensions 
of the operational definition of mafia.  
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 Both the mayor and the prefect of Milan have minimized the threat of the presence of the 
mafia in the North (“I soldi son desideri”; “La Moratti ad Annozero: la mafia a Milano non 
esiste”; Galli, “Il prefetto: a Milano la mafia non esiste - Milano.”) 
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Secondly, the MI covers the 1983-2008 time period (except for the variable 
“city councils dissolved for mafia infiltration”, which refers to the 1991-2008 period). 
Consequently, the index provides a long-period analysis of the mafia, avoiding the 
risks of relying only on data relative to a few years.  
Thirdly, the MI is disaggregated at the provincial level. This level is more 
detailed than the regional one and enables identification of different patterns within 
the Italian regions, even within those with a traditional mafia presence.  
Fourthly, the MI was calculated using two different procedures. The first 
(MI(rate)) reflected the actual distribution of the selected variables among Italian 
provinces. The second (MI(rank)) focused on each province’s rank among all the 
provinces, thus highlighting the relative positions instead of the actual rates. This 
second procedure shed light on the presence of the mafia outside the regions with a 
traditional mafia presence. The MI was tested against the MIen, an alternative index 
comprising a further seven variables among those most frequently used by existing 
measurements in the literature. The two sets of indicators yielded very similar results 
This further confirmed the quality of the MI, which is based only on four indicators 
and variables.  
The scores of the MI confirm the critical situation of some provinces in 
Southern Italy where mafia-type associations have been traditionally present. 
However, the MI(rank) produces significant scores outside the South of Italy as well, 
highlighting that the mafia is a national problem which should not be reduced to a 
problem specific to the South (implicitly related to underdevelopment and poverty).  
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Annex I 
Table 11. Correlation matrix 
Correlations   
416-bis omma beni com Re.ge 
Tentom
ma 
Dann s 
inc 
Attent Seq Inc Est Contrab Prost Stup TrafRif Usura Ricicl Contraff art416 PuPrOFf 
416-bis Pearson’s r. 1.000 0.860(**) 0.642(**) 0.710(**) 0.794(**) 0.613(**) 0.696(**) 0.668(**) 0.465(**) 0.676(**) 0.618(**) 0.130 -0.068 -0.250(*) 0.055 0.239(*) 0.174 0.091 0.693(**) 0.560(**) 
 Sig. (2-code)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.492 0.011 0.583 0.015 0.078 0.360 0.000 0.000 
omma Pearson’s r 0.860(**) 1.000 0.640(**) 0.766(**) 0.570(**) 0.675(**) 0.498(**) 0.632(**) 0.479(**) 0.558(**) 0.447(**) 0.193 -0.063 -0.183 0.023 0.124 0.158 0.078 0.580(**) 0.507(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.528 0.065 0.821 0.213 0.110 0.436 0.000 0.000 
beni Pearson’s r 0.642(**) 0.640(**) 1.000 0.673(**) 0.557(**) 0.477(**) 0.464(**) 0.465(**) 0.416(**) 0.482(**) 0.350(**) 0.120 -0.054 -0.169 -0.059 0.138 0.098 0.062 0.507(**) 0.380(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.585 0.088 0.556 0.164 0.324 0.531 0.000 0.000 
com Pearson’s r 0.710(**) 0.766(**) 0.673(**) 1.000 0.591(**) 0.588(**) 0.466(**) 0.423(**) 0.365(**) 0.377(**) 0.403(**) 0.396(**) -0.066 -0.203(*) -0.025 0.170 0.129 0.125 0.608(**) 0.349(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.510 0.040 0.803 0.086 0.196 0.207 0.000 0.000 
Re.ge Pearson’s r 0.794(**) 0.570(**) 0.557(**) 0.591(**) 1.000 0.445(**) 0.708(**) 0.483(**) 0.311(**) 0.593(**) 0.451(**) 0.032 -0.073 -0.206(*) 0.084 0.258(**) 0.082 0.032 0.525(**) 0.464(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.752 0.466 0.037 0.396 0.009 0.410 0.748 0.000 0.000 
Tentomma Pearson’s r 0.613(**) 0.675(**) 0.477(**) 0.588(**) 0.445(**) 1.000 0.525(**) 0.470(**) 0.560(**) 0.599(**) 0.575(**) 0.154 -0.044 -0.037 0.033 0.277(**) 0.273(**) 0.073 0.552(**) 0.447(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.662 0.713 0.743 0.005 0.005 0.465 0.000 0.000 
Dann s inc Pearson’s r 0.696(**) 0.498(**) 0.464(**) 0.466(**) 0.708(**) 0.525(**) 1.000 0.716(**) 0.425(**) 0.885(**) 0.532(**) -0.018 -0.081 -0.205(*) -0.048 0.225(*) 0.147 0.078 0.425(**) 0.545(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.857 0.417 0.037 0.627 0.023 0.137 0.436 0.000 0.000 
Attent Pearson’s r 0.668(**) 0.632(**) 0.465(**) 0.423(**) 0.483(**) 0.470(**) 0.716(**) 1.000 0.568(**) 0.753(**) 0.382(**) 0.018 -0.075 -0.198(*) -0.035 0.073 0.127 0.006 0.325(**) 0.426(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.858 0.452 0.046 0.727 0.465 0.201 0.950 0.001 0.000 
Seq Pearson’s r 0.465(**) 0.479(**) 0.416(**) 0.365(**) 0.311(**) 0.560(**) 0.425(**) 0.568(**) 1.000 0.490(**) 0.485(**) -0.029 0.055 0.047 -0.079 0.185 0.134 0.184 0.440(**) 0.281(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.768 0.582 0.637 0.426 0.061 0.178 0.063 0.000 0.004 
Inc Pearson’s r 0.676(**) 0.558(**) 0.482(**) 0.377(**) 0.593(**) 0.599(**) 0.885(**) 0.753(**) 0.490(**) 1.000 0.539(**) -0.030 -0.126 -0.186 0.015 0.258(**) 0.163 0.116 0.423(**) 0.647(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.766 0.204 0.059 0.883 0.009 0.101 0.244 0.000 0.000 
Est Pearson’s r 0.618(**) 0.447(**) 0.350(**) 0.403(**) 0.451(**) 0.575(**) 0.532(**) 0.382(**) 0.485(**) 0.539(**) 1.000 0.190 -0.006 -0.148 0.048 0.522(**) 0.259(**) 0.253(**) 0.671(**) 0.402(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.054 0.951 0.137 0.628 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Contrab Pearson’s r 0.130 0.193 0.120 0.396(**) 0.032 0.154 -0.018 0.018 -0.029 -0.030 0.190 1.000 -0.053 0.005 -0.049 0.059 0.192 0.217(*) 0.351(**) 0.086 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.190 0.051 0.229 0.000 0.752 0.120 0.857 0.858 0.768 0.766 0.054  0.596 0.959 0.624 0.557 0.052 0.028 0.000 0.390 
Prost Pearson’s r -0.068 -0.063 -0.054 -0.066 -0.073 -0.044 -0.081 -0.075 0.055 -0.126 -0.006 -0.053 1.000 0.132 -0.036 0.064 0.007 -0.040 0.112 -0.077 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.492 0.528 0.585 0.510 0.466 0.662 0.417 0.452 0.582 0.204 0.951 0.596  0.184 0.718 0.521 0.941 0.687 0.259 0.442 
Stup Pearson’s r -0.250(*) -0.183 -0.169 -0.203(*) -0.206(*) -0.037 -0.205(*) -0.198(*) 0.047 -0.186 -0.148 0.005 0.132 1.000 0.013 -0.075 0.204(*) 0.070 -0.121 -0.266(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.011 0.065 0.088 0.040 0.037 0.713 0.037 0.046 0.637 0.059 0.137 0.959 0.184  0.899 0.454 0.039 0.480 0.224 0.007 
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Correlations   
416-bis omma beni com Re.ge 
Tentom
ma 
Dann s 
inc 
Attent Seq Inc Est Contrab Prost Stup TrafRif Usura Ricicl Contraff art416 PuPrOFf 
TrafRif Pearson’s r 0.055 0.023 -0.059 -0.025 0.084 0.033 -0.048 -0.035 -0.079 0.015 0.048 -0.049 -0.036 0.013 1.000 0.064 0.067 -0.046 0.000 0.073 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.583 0.821 0.556 0.803 0.396 0.743 0.627 0.727 0.426 0.883 0.628 0.624 0.718 0.899  0.520 0.503 0.648 0.999 0.463 
Usura Pearson’s r 0.239(*) 0.124 0.138 0.170 0.258(**) 0.277(**) 0.225(*) 0.073 0.185 0.258(**) 0.522(**) 0.059 0.064 -0.075 0.064 1.000 0.327(**) 0.246(*) 0.523(**) 0.403(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.015 0.213 0.164 0.086 0.009 0.005 0.023 0.465 0.061 0.009 0.000 0.557 0.521 0.454 0.520  0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Ricicl Pearson’s r 0.174 0.158 0.098 0.129 0.082 0.273(**) 0.147 0.127 0.134 0.163 0.259(**) 0.192 0.007 0.204(*) 0.067 0.327(**) 1.000 0.113 0.387(**) 0.150 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.078 0.110 0.324 0.196 0.410 0.005 0.137 0.201 0.178 0.101 0.008 0.052 0.941 0.039 0.503 0.001  0.256 0.000 0.132 
Contraff Pearson’s r 0.091 0.078 0.062 0.125 0.032 0.073 0.078 0.006 0.184 0.116 0.253(**) 0.217(*) -0.040 0.070 -0.046 0.246(*) 0.113 1.000 0.315(**) 0.178 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.360 0.436 0.531 0.207 0.748 0.465 0.436 0.950 0.063 0.244 0.010 0.028 0.687 0.480 0.648 0.012 0.256  0.001 0.072 
art416 Pearson’s r 0.693(**) 0.580(**) 0.507(**) 0.608(**) 0.525(**) 0.552(**) 0.425(**) 0.325(**) 0.440(**) 0.423(**) 0.671(**) 0.351(**) 0.112 -0.121 0.000 0.523(**) 0.387(**) 0.315(**) 1.000 0.489(**) 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.224 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.001  0.000 
PuPrOFf Pearson’s r 0.560(**) 0.507(**) 0.380(**) 0.349(**) 0.464(**) 0.447(**) 0.545(**) 0.426(**) 0.281(**) 0.647(**) 0.402(**) 0.086 -0.077 -0.266(**) 0.073 0.403(**) 0.150 0.178 0.489(**) 1.000 
 Sig. (2-code) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.442 0.007 0.463 0.000 0.132 0.072 0.000  
 N= 103 for all variables           
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)            
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)              
Legend:  
416-bis: mafia-type associations (police reported) 
Omma: mafia murders 
Beni: assets confiscated from organised crime 
Com: City councils dissolved for mafia infiltration 
Re.ge: mafia-type associations (indicted) 
Tentomma: attempted mafia murders 
Dann s inc: damage followed by arson 
Attent: bomb of fire attacks 
Seq : kidnapping for ransom 
Inc : arsons 
Est : extortions 
Contrab : smuggling 
Prost : exploitation of prostitution 
Stup : drug offences 
TrafRif: trafficking in waste 
Usura: usury 
Ricicl: money-laundering 
Contraff: counterfeiting 
art416: criminal associations 
PuPrOFf: offences relating to public procurement
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Figure 1. Mafia-type associations, average provincial annual rate (period 1983-2008) per 100,000 
inhabitants. Frequency distribution 
 
N=103 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Figure 2. Mafia murders, average provincial annual rate (period 1983-2008) per 100,000 
inhabitants. Frequency distribution 
 
N=103 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Figure 3. City councils dissolved for organised crime infiltration, average provincial annual rate 
(period 1991-2009) per 100 municipalities. Frequency distribution 
 
N=103 
Source: author’s calculations 
 44 
 
Figure 4. Assets confiscated from organised crime, average provincial annual rate (period 1983-
2009) per 100,000 inhabitants. Frequency distribution 
 
N=103 
Source: author’s calculations 
